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Deep Learning algorithms have achieved the state-of-the-art performance for Image Classification and have
been used even in security-critical applications, such as biometric recognition systems and self-driving cars.
However, recent works have shown those algorithms, which can even surpass the human capabilities, are
vulnerable to adversarial examples. In Computer Vision, adversarial examples are images containing subtle
perturbations generated by malicious optimization algorithms in order to fool classifiers. As an attempt
to mitigate these vulnerabilities, numerous countermeasures have been constantly proposed in literature.
Nevertheless, devising an efficient defense mechanism has proven to be a difficult task, since many approaches
have already shown to be ineffective to adaptive attackers. Thus, this self-containing paper aims to provide
all readerships with a review of the latest research progress on Adversarial Machine Learning in Image
Classification, however with a defender’s perspective. Here, novel taxonomies for categorizing adversarial
attacks and defenses are introduced and discussions about the existence of adversarial examples are provided.
Further, in contrast to exisiting surveys, it is also given relevant guidance that should be taken into consideration
by researchers when devising and evaluating defenses. Finally, based on the reviewed literature, it is discussed
some promising paths for future research.
CCSConcepts: • Information systems→Decision support systems; • Security andprivacy→Domain-
specific security and privacy architectures; • Computing methodologies→ Neural networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the last years, Deep Learning algorithms have made an important and rapid progress in solving
numerous tasks involving complex analysis of raw data. Among some relevant cases, it can be
mentioned major advances in speech recognition and natural language processing [39, 194], games
[162], finacial market analysis [78], fraud and malware detection [38, 94], prevention of DDoS
attacks [199] and Computer Vision [74, 83, 96, 173, 174]. In the field of Computer Vision, the
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have become the state-of-the-art Deep Learning algorithms
since Krizhevsky et al. [96] have presented innovative results in image classification tasks using
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the AlexNet architecture. Thereafter, motivated by the continuous popularization of GPUs and
frameworks, the CNNs have kept growing in performance, being currently even used in security-
critical apllications, such as medical sciences and diagnostics [33, 110], autonomous vehicles [14],
surveillance systems [43] and biometric and handwritten characterers recognition [7, 168, 179].
Nevertheless, some researchers have begun to argue if the same deep learning algorithms,
which could even surpass the human performance [92], were actually robust enough to be used
in safety-critical environments. Unfortunately, since the paper of Szegedy et al. [175], various
works have highlighted the vulnerability of deep learning models in different tasks such as speech
recognition [24], text classification [47], malware detection [69] and specially image classification
[23, 66, 147] before adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks are usually conducted in the form of
subtle perturbations generated by an optimization algorithm and inserted into a legitimate image
in order to produce an adversarial example which, in the field of Computer Vision is specifically
known as adversarial image. After being sent to be classified, an adversarial image is often able
to lead CNNs to produce a prediction different from the expected, usually with a high confidence.
Adversarial attacks on image classifiers are the most common in the literature and, for this reason,
are the focus of this paper.
The vulnerability of CNNs and other Deep Learning algorithms to adversarial attacks have
forced the scientific community to revisit all the processes related to the construction of intelligent
models, from the elaboration of architectures to the formulation of the training algorithms used, as a
attempt to hypothesize some possible reasons concerning this lack of robustness1 and thus propose
countermeasures that may hold future attacks of adversarial nature. This arms race between attacks
and defenses against adversarial examples has ended up forming a recent research area called
Adversarial Machine Learning that, in a nutshell, struggles to construct more robust Deep Learning
models.
Adversarial Machine Learning in Image Classification is currently a very active research path
which is responsible for most of the work in the area, with novel papers produced almost daily.
However, there is neither a known efficient solution for securing Deep Leanirng models nor any
fully accepted explanations for the existence of adversarial images yet. Taking into account the
dynamism and relevance of this research area, it is crucial to be available in literature comprehensive
and up-to-date review papers in order to position and orientate their readers about the actual
scenario. Although there are already some extensive surveys [2, 187, 198], they have already become
somewhat outdated due to the great activity in the area. Moreover, they bring out a general overview
of the Adversarial Machine Learning field, what, in turn, contributes to these papers neither have
focused enough in works that have proposed defenses against adversarial attacks nor have provided
proper guidance for those who wishes to invest in novel countermeasures.
Therefore, keeping in mind the importance of Adversarial Machine Learning in Image Classifi-
cation to the development of more robust defenses and architectures against adversarial attacks,
this self-contained paper aims to provide for all readerships an exhaustive and detailed review of
the literature, however with a defender’s perspective. The present survey covers from the back-
ground needed to clarify the reader essential concepts in the area to the techinical formalisms
related to adversarial examples and attacks. Futhermore, a comprehensive survey of defenses and
coutermeasures against adversarial attacks is made and categorized on a novel taxonomy. Then,
based on the works of Carlini and Wagner [21] and Carlini et al. [19], the present paper discusses
some principles for designing and evaluating defenses which are intended to guide researchers
1Robustness can be defined as the capacity of a model or defense to tolerate adversarial disturbances by delivering reliable
and stable outputs [190].
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to introduce stronger security methods. Essentially, the main contributions of this work are the
following:
• The update of some existing taxonomies in order to categorize different types of adversarial
images and novel attack approaches that have raised in literature;
• The discussion and organization of defenses against adversarial attacks based on a novel taxon-
omy;
• The address of relevant explanations for the existence of adversarial examples;
• The provision of some important guidances that should be followed by researchers when devising
and evaluating defenses;
• The discussion of promising research paths for future works in the field.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 brings an essential background
which covers important topics and concepts for the proper understanding of this work. Section 3
formalizes and also categorizes adversarial examples and attacks. Section 4 makes a deep review
on defenses existing in literature and proposes a novel taxonomy for organizing them. Section
5 addresses and formalizes relevant explanations for the existence of adversarial examples that
have supported the development of attacks and defenses. Section 6 provides close guidance based
on relevant work to help defenders and reviewers to respectivelly design and evaluate security
methods. Section 7 lists promising research paths in Adversarial Machine Learning for Image
Classification. Finally, Section 8 brings the final considerations.
2 BACKGROUND
Conventional Machine Learning models (also known as shallow models [11]) have begun to have
high dependency of domain experts and present critical limitations when attempting to extract
useful patterns from complex data, such as images and audio speech [198]. Therefore, it has been
necessary to develop traditional learning algorithms into more elaborated architectures, forming
a recent area in Artificial Intelligence called Deep Learning [81]. Deep Learning is a subfield of
Machine Learning where its algorithms simulate the operation of the human brain in order to extract
and learn hidden representations from raw inputs, oftentimes without any human intervention.
Mostly, Deep Learning is based on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), which are formed by many
layers containing numerous processing units, which gathers knowledge from a massive amount
of data by appling several linear and non-linear transformations on the received inputs, which in
turn, allows these models to learn high-level abstractions from simpler concepts [63, 72, 124].
This paper focuses mostly on Convolutional Neural Networks. CNNs are a special type of
Deep Neural Network and currently are the state-of-the-art algorithms for Image Classification
[184]. However, Appendix A briefly covers other tasks Adversarial Machine Learning takes part
in Computer Vision. The next section explains, in a nutshell, the main components of a CNN, in
addition to list the state-of-the-art architectures over the years, according to the ILSVRC challenge
[154].
2.1 Convolutional Neural Networks
CNN architectures usually perform feature learning by making use of (i) convolution and (ii)
pooling layers which, respectivelly, extracts useful features from images and reduces their spatial
dimensionality. After feature learning, comes the fully connected layer (FC), which works in a
way similar to a common neural network. In a classification task, FCs produce a single probability
vector as output, which is called the probability vector. The probability vector contains membership
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probabilities of a given input x corresponding to each class ci ∈ Cn , where Cn is the set containing
all the n classes belonging to the original problem. Summing up all the probabilities must result in
1, and the chosen class for x is the one which has the highest membership probability. Figure 1
depicts an example of a standard architecture of a CNN.
Fig. 1. The standard architecture of a CNN. Adapted from Guo et al. [72].
An important contest in Computer Vision, called ILSVRC (ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recogni-
tion Challenge) [154], has encouraged until 2017 the creation of more accurate CNN architectures.
Figure 2 shows some relevant CNN architectures over the years in ILSVRC challenge, namely
AlexNet [96], ZFNet [201], VGGNet [163], GoogLeNet [173], ResNet [75], TrimpsNet2 and SENet
[83]. Since 2015, CNNs have surpassed the human performance [92].
Fig. 2. Top-5 error rate3of winning CNN architectures in ILSVRC classification challenge over the years [154].
Since 2015, the CNNs have surpassed the human’s performance [92].
2.2 Other Deep Learning Algorithms
Apart from CNNs, there are other important Deep Learning architectures which are frequently
used in Adversarial Machine Learning, such as Autoencoders (AEs) and Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs). The next sections describe these architectures in more details.
2.2.1 Autoencoders. An autoencoder is a neural network which aims to approximate its output
to an input sample, or in other words, it tries to approximate an input x to its identity function
by generating an output xˆ as similiar as possible to x from a compressed representation learnt.
An example of an autoencoder architecture is depicted by Figure 3. Despite looking a trivial task,
2There has been no novel scientific contribution which justified the production of a paper, and for this reason, the authors
of TrimpsNet only shared the results using the ImageNet and COCO joint workshop in ECCV 2016, which are available at:
http://image-net.org/challenges/talks/2016/Trimps-Soushen@ILSVRC2016.pdf. Accessed in February 12, 2020.
3In contrast to the traditional top-1 classification, a top-5 classification considers a model had a correct predition when,
given a test sample, its true class is among the five highest output probabilites predicted by this model.
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the autoencoder is actually trying to learn the inner representations of the input, regarding the
structure of data. Autoencoders are useful for two main purposes: (i) dimensionality reduction,
retaining only the most important data features [82, 112, 157] and (ii) data generation process [41].
Fig. 3. An example of an autoencoder architecture.
2.2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are a framework
introduced by Goodfellow et al. [65] for building generative models PG which resembles the data
distribution Pdata used in the training set. GANs can be used to improve the representation of
data, to conduct unsurpevised learning and to even construct defenses against adversarial images
[65, 198]. There are works that have also used GANs for other purposes, such as image-to-image
translation and visual style transfer [88, 203]. The GANs are composed by two models (usually
deep networks) trained simultaneously: a generator G and a discriminator D. The generator receives
an input x and tries to generate an output z from a probability distribution PG . In contrast, the
discriminator classifies z, producing a label that determines if z belongs to the distribution Pdata
(benign or real input) or PG (fake or adversarial input). In other words, the generator G is actually
being trained to fool the classifier D. In this competing scenario, GANs are usually capable of
generating data samples that looks close to benign examples.
3 ADVERSARIAL IMAGES AND ATTACKS
Formally, an adversarial image can be defined as follows: let f be a classification model trained
with legitimate images (i.e. images which do not have any malicious perturbations) and let x be a
legitimate image (where x ∈ Rw×h×c , such thatw and h are the dimensions of the image and c is its
amount of color channels), then it is crafted, from x , an image x ′, such that x ′ = x + δx , where
δx is the perturbation needed to make x cross the decision boundary, resulting f (x) , f (x ′) (see
Figure 4a). The perturbation δx can also be interpreted as a vector ®δx , where its magnitude ∥ ®δx ∥
represents the amount of perturbation needed to translate the point represented by the image x
in the space beyond the decision boundary. Figure 4b illustrates a didactic example of inserting
a perturbation δx into a legitimate image x on a 2D space. According to Cao and Gong [18], an
adversarial image is considered optimal if it satisfies two requirements: (i) if the perturbations
inserted on this image are imperceptible to human eyes and (ii) if these perturbations are able to
induce the classification model to produce an incorrect output, preferably with a high confidence.
3.1 Taxonomy of Adversarial Images
This section is based on the works of Barreno et al., Huang et al., Kumar and Mehta, Xiao, Yuan et al.
and Brendel et al. [10, 15, 84, 97, 190, 198] to propose a broader4 taxomomy to adversarial images
formed by three diferent axes: (i) perturbation scope, (ii) perturbation visibility and (iii) perturbation
measurement. The next sections explain each axis in details.
4For comparative purposes, the novel topics proposed by this paper are underlined.
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3.1.1 Perturbation Scope. Adversarial images may contain individual-scoped perturbations or
universal-scoped perturbations.
• Individual-scoped perturbations: individual-scoped perturbations are the most common in
literature. They are generated individually for each input image;
• Universal-scoped perturbations: universal-scoped perturbations are image-agnostic pertur-
bations, i.e. they are perturbations generated independently from any input sample. Nevertheless,
when they are applied to an legitimate image, the resulting adversarial example is often able to
lead models to misclassification [128, 131]. Universal perturbations permit adversarial attacks
being conducted more easily in real-word scenarios, since these perturbations are crafted just
once to be inserted into any sample belonging to a certain dataset.
3.1.2 Perturbation Visibility. The efficiency and visibility of perturbations can be organized as:
• Optimal perturbations: these perturbations are imperceptible to human eyes, but are useful to
lead deep learning models to misclassification, usually with a high confidence on the prediction;
• Indistinguishable perturbations: indistinguishable perturbations are also imperceptible to
human eyes, however they are insufficient to fool deep learning models;
• Visible perturbations: perturbations that, when inserted into a image, are able to fool deep
learning models. However they can also be easily spotted by humans [16, 91];
• Physical perturbations: are perturbations designed outside the digital scope and physically
added to real-world objects themselves [50]. Although some works have adapted physical pertur-
bations to Image Classification [98], they are usually directed to tasks involving Object Detection
[32, 50, 178] (see Appendix C);
• Fooling images: perturbations which corrupt images to the point of making them unrecogniz-
able by humans. Nevertheless, the classification models believe these corrupted images belong
to one of the classes of the original classification problem, sometimes assigning to them a high
confidence on the prediction [138]. Fooling images are also known as rubbish class examples [66];
• Noise: in contrast to the malicious nature of perturbations, noises are non-malicious or non-
optimal corruptions that may be present or inserted into a input image. An example of noise is
the gaussian noise.
3.1.3 Perturbation Measurement. Given the fact that it is difficult to define a metric that measures
the capability of human vision, the p-norms are most used to control the size and the amount of the
perturbations that are inserted into a image [126]. The p-norm Lp computes the distance ∥x − x ′∥p
in the input space between a legitimate image x and the resulting adversarial example x ′, where
p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞}. In Equation 1 is defined the p-norm when p = 1 (Manhattan Distance) and p = 2
(Euclidean Distance):
Lp =
p
√∑
|x − x ′ |p (1)
When p = 0, it is counted up the number of pixels that have been modified in a legitimate sample in
order to generate the adversarial image. On the other hand, theL∞measures themaximumdifference
among all pixels in the corresponding positions between two images. For L∞ norm, each pixel is
allowed to be modified within a maximum limit of perturbation, without having any restriction for
the number of modified pixels. Formally, L∞ = ∥x − x ′∥∞ = max
(x1 − x ′1 ,x2 − x ′2 , · · · ,xn − x ′n ) .
Despite the norms p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞} be the most used when computing perturbations, there are some
works that have defined custom metrics, as can be seen in Table 1.
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Fig. 4. (a): Malicious and usually imperceptible perturbations present in a input image can induce trained
models to misclassification. Adapted from Klarreich [93]. (b): The objective of an adversarial attack is to
generate a perturbation δx and insert it into a legitimate image x in order to make the resulting adversarial
image x ′ = x + δx cross the decision boundary. Adapted from Bakhti et al. [8].
3.2 Taxonomy of Attacks and Attackers
This section is also based on the concepts and definitions of the works of Akhtar and Mian, Barreno
et al., Brendel et al., Kumar and Mehta, Xiao and Yuan et al. [2, 10, 15, 97, 190, 198] to extend5
existing taxonomies which organize attacks and attackers. In the context of security, adversarial
attacks and attackers are categorized under threat models. A threat model defines the conditions
under which a defense is designed to provide security garantees against certain types of attacks
and attackers [19]. Basically, a threat model delimiters (i) the knowledge an attacker has about the
targeted classifier (such as its parameters and architecture), (ii) his goal with the adversarial attack
and (iii) how he will perform the adversarial attack. A threat model can be then classified into six
different axes: (i) attacker’s influency, (ii) attacker’s knowledge, (iii) security violation, (iv) attack
specificity, (v) attack computation and (vi) attack approach.
3.2.1 Attacker’s Influence. This axis defines how the attacker will control the learning process
of deep learning models. According to Xiao [190], the attacker can perform two types of attack,
taking into account his influence on the classification model: (i) causative or poisoning attacks and
(ii) evasive or exploratory attacks.
• Causative or poisoning attacks: in causative attacks, the attacker has influence on the deep
learning model during its training stage. In this type of attack, the training samples are corrupted
or the training set is polluted with adversarial examples in order to produce a classification model
incompatible with the original data distribution;
• Evasive or exploratory attacks: in constrast of causative attacks, in evasive attacks the attacker
has influence on the deep learning models during the inference or testing stage. Evasive attacks
are the most common type of attack, where the attacker craft adversarial examples that lead
deep learning models to misclassification, usually with a high confidence on the prediction.
Evasive attacks can also have an exploratory nature, where the attacker’s objective is to gather
information about the targeted model, such as its parameters, architectures, cost functions, etc.
The most common exploratory attack is the input/output attack, where the attacker provides
the targeted model with adversarial images crafted by him. Afterwards, the attacker observes
the outputs given by the model and tries to reproduce a substitute or surrogate model, so that it
5Again here, the novel topics proposed by this paper are highlighted by undelined font.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: September 2020.
8 Machado, et al.
can be similar to the targeted model. The input/output attack is usually the first step to perform
black-box attacks (see Section 3.2.2).
3.2.2 Attacker’s Knowledge. Taking into consideration the attacker’s knowlegde with respect to
the targeted model, three types of attacks can be performed: (i) white-box attacks, (ii) black-box
attacks and (iii) grey-box attacks.
• White-box attacks: in a white-box attack, the attacker has fully access to the model’s and
even the defense’s parameters and architectures, whenever such defense exists. This attack
scenario probably would be the least frequent in real-world applications, due to the adoption
of protection measures (such as users control, for example) in order to prevent unauthorized
people access to the system components. By contrast, white-box attacks are usually the most
powerful type of adversarial attack, and for this reason, are commonly used to evaluate the
robustness of defenses and/or classification models when they are undergone to harsh conditions.
Unfortunately, elaborating countermeasures resistant to white-box attacks is, so far, an open
problem;
• Black-box attacks: in this scenario, the attacker neither has access nor knowledge about any
information concerning the classification model and the defense method, when present. Black-box
attacks impose more restrictions to attackers, nonetheless they are important when reproducing
external adversarial attacks aiming deployed models, which in turn, better represent real-world
scenarios [146]. Despite the greater difficulty to perform black-box attacks, the attacker still might
be able to evade the target model due to the transferability of adversarial examples. Works such
as Szegedy et al. and Papernot et al. [146, 175] have shown the malicious effect of an adversarial
image, generated using a certain classifier, is able to transfer and fool other classifiers, including
the ones created by different learning algorithms (check Section 5.7 for more details). With
this property in favor of the attacker, he can create an empirical model through a causative
attack called substitute or surrogate model, which has similar parameters to the targeted model’s.
Therefore, the attacker can use this surrogate model to craft adversarial images and, afterwards,
deploy them to be, oftentimes, misclassified by the targeted model;
• Grey-box attacks: this attack scenario has been firstly proposed by Meng and Chen [126]. In
grey-box attacks, the attacker has access to the classification model, but does not have access to
any information concerning the defense method. Grey-box attacks are an intermediate alternative
to evaluate defenses and classifiers, since they impose a greater threat level when compared
to the black-box attacks, but without giving a wide advantage to the attacker when providing
him as well with all the information concerning the defense method, as performed in white-box
scenarios.
3.2.3 Security Violation. Security violations are often associated with the attacker’s objective when
performing an adversarial attack against a classifier. The security violations caused by adversarial
attacks can affect the (i) integrity, (ii) availability and the (iii) privacy of the targeted classifiers.
• Integrity violation: this is the most common violation provoked by an adversarial attack. The
integrity is affected when adversarial images, crafted by an certain attacker, are able to stealthily
bypass existing countermeasures and lead targeted models to misclassification, but without
compromising the functionality of the system;
• Availability violation: occurs when the functionality of the system is also compromised, causing
a denial of service. Availability violations mainly affect the reliability of learning systems by
raising uncertainty of their predictions;
• Privacy violation: happens when the attacker is able to gain access to relevant information
regarding the targeted model, such as its parameters, architecture and learning algorithms used.
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Privacy violations in deep learning are strictly related to black-box attacks, where the attacker
queries the targeted model in order to reverse-engineer it and produce a surrogate model, which
crafts adversarial examples closer to the original data distribution.
3.2.4 Attack Specificity. With respect to specificity, an attacker can perform a (i) targeted attack
and an (ii) untargeted (or indiscriminate) attack. Targeted attacks aim to craft an adversarial image
in order to lead the model to misclassify it in a predetermined class, chosen beforehand by the
attacker. On the other hand, in untargeted attacks, the attacker just seeks to fool the model by
aiming any class different from the legitimate class corresponding to the original example. Formally,
let x be a legitimate image, y the original class of the image x and f a classification model; then,
an adversarial image x ′ = x + δx is crafted from x . In a targeted attack, the attacker seeks to craft
a perturbation δx in order to produce in f as output a specific class y ′, such that f (x + δx) = y ′
and y ′ , y. Conversely, in an untargeted attack, it is generated an adversarial image x ′, such that
f (x) , f (x ′). Targeted attacks usually present higher computational costs when compared to
untargeted attacks.
3.2.5 Attack Computation. The algorithms used to compute perturbations can be (i) sequential
and (ii) iterative. The sequential algorithms compute in just one iteration, the perturbation that will
be inserted into a legitimate image. Iterative algorithms, in turn, make use of more iterations in
order to craft the perturbation. Since iterative algorithms make use of more iterations to compute
perturbations, they have a higher computational cost when compared to sequential algorithms.
However, the perturbations generated by iterative algorithms are usually smaller and more eficient
to fool classification models than those generated by one-step procedures.
3.2.6 Attack Approach. Adversarial attacks can also be organized with respect to the approach used
by the attack algorithm to craft the perturbation. According to [15], the approach of adversarial
attacks can be based on (i) gradient, (ii) transferibility/score, (iii) decision and (iv) approximation.
• Gradient-based attacks: this attack approach is the most used in literature. The gradient-based
algorithms make use of detailed information of the target model concerning its gradient with
respect to the given input. This attack approach is usually performed in white-box scenarions,
when the attacker has full knowledge and access to the targeted model;
• Transfer/Score-based attacks: these attack algortihms either depend on getting access to the
dataset used by the targeted model or the scores predicted by it in order to approximate a gradient.
Usually, the outputs obtained by querying a targeted deep neural network are used as scores.
These scores are then used along with the training dataset to fit a surrogate model which will
craft the perturbations that will be inserted into the legitimate images. This attack approach is
often useful in black-box attacks;
• Decision-based attacks: this approach has been firstly introduced by Brendel et al. [15], and it
is considered by the authors as a simpler and more flexible approach, since requires few changes
in parameters than gradient-based attacks. A decision-based attack usually queries the softmax
layer of the targeted model and, iteratively, computes smaller perturbations by using a process of
rejection sampling;
• Approximation-based attacks: attacks algorithms based on this approach try to approximate a
gradient for some targeted model or defense formed by a non-differentiable technique usually by
applying numerical methods. These approximated gradients are then used to compute adversarial
perturbations.
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3.3 Algorithms for Generating Adversarial Images
In Computer Vision, the algorithms used to generate adversarial perturbations are optimization
methods that usually explore generalization flaws in pretrained models in order to craft and insert
perturbations into legitimate images. The next sections will describe with more details four attack
algorithms frequently used, namely (i) FGSM [66], (ii) BIM [98], (iii) DeepFool [132] and (iv) CW
Attack [23]. Afterwards, Table 1 organizes, according to the taxonomies presented in Sections 3.1
and 3.2, other important attack algorithms.
3.3.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM is a sequential algorithm proposed by Goodfellow
et al. [66] to sustain his linear hypothesis for explaining the existence of adversarial examples
(see Section 5.2). The main characteristic of FGSM is its low computational cost, resulted from
perturbing, in just one step (limited by a given upper bound ϵ), a legitimate image at the direction
of the gradient that maximizes the model error. Despite its efficiency, the perturbations generated
by FGSM are usually greater and less effective to fool models than the perturbations generated
by iterative algorithms. Given an image x ∈ Rw×h×c , FGSM generates an adversarial image x ′
according to Equation 2:
x ′ = x − ϵ · siдn(®∇x J (Θ,x ,y)) (2)
where ®∇x represents the gradient vector,Θ represents the network parameters,y the class associated
to x , ϵ the maximum amount of perturbation that can be inserted into x and J (Θ,x ,y) the cost
function used to train the neural network.
3.3.2 Basic Iterative Method (BIM). This attack is a iterative version of FGSM, initially proposed
by Kurakin et al. [98]. In constrast to FGSM, BIM executes several minor steps α , where the total
size of the perturbation is limited by an upper bound defined by the attacker. Formally, BIM can be
defined as a recursive method, which generates x ′ according to Equation 3:
x ′ =
{
x ′0 = 0
x ′i = x
′
i−1 − clip(α · sign(®∇x J (Θ,x ′i−1,y))
(3)
where clip limits values to the lower and higher edges outside the given interval.
3.3.3 DeepFool. The main ideia behind DeepFool, proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [132],
consists of finding the nearest decision boundary of a given legitimate image x and then subtly
perturb this image to make it cross the boundary and fool the classifier. Basically, DeepFool
approximates, for each iteration, the solution of this problem by linearizing the classifier around an
intermediate x ′. The intermediate x ′ is then updated towards the direction of an optimal direction
by a small step α . This process is repeated until the small perturbation computed by DeepFool
makes x ′ cross the decision boundary. Similarly to FGSM, DeepFool is also based on the linearity
hypothesis to craft perturbations.
3.3.4 Carlini & Wagner Attack. The CW attack has been proposed by Carlini and Wagner [23] and
currently represents the state-of-the-art algorithm for generating adversarial images. Formally,
given an DNN f having a logits layer z and a input image x belonging to a class t , CW uses the
gradient descent to solve iteratively Equation 4:
minimize | |x − x ′ | |22 + c · ℓ(x ′) (4)
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where, for x , the attack seeks for a small perturbation δx = x − x ′ that is able to fool the classifier.
To do so, a hyperparameter c is used as an attempt to compute the minimal amount of perturbation
required. Besides c , there is the cost function ℓ(x ′), which is defined according to Equation 5.
ℓ(x ′) = max(max{z(x ′)i : i , t} − z(x ′)t ,−conf ) (5)
In Equation 5, the hyperparameter conf refers to the attack confidence rate. Higher conf values
contribute to generate adversarial images capable of fooling models with a high confidence rate, i.e.
with predictions reaching probabilities up to 100% in a incorrect class t ′ , t . On the other hand,
higher conf values also produce adversarial images usually containing larger perturbations which
are easily perceptible by humans.
Table 1. Main adversarial attack algorithms in Computer Vision.*
Algorithm and Reference Perturbation Scope Perturbation Visibility Perturbation Measurement Attacker’s Knowledge Attack Specificity Attack Approach
FGSM [66] individual optimal, visible L∞ white-box untargeted gradient
JSMA [147] individual optimal L0 white-box targeted gradient
L-BFGS [175] individual optimal L∞ white-box targeted gradient
POBA-GA [29] individual optimal custom black-box targeted, untargeted decision
AutoZoom [182] individual optimal L2 black-box targeted, untargeted decision
DeepFool [132] individual, universal optimal L1 , L2 , L∞ white-box untargeted gradient
LaVAN [91] individual, universal visible L2 white-box targeted gradient
Universal Adversarial Networks (UAN) [73] universal optimal L2 , L∞ white-box targeted gradient
Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) [6] individual optimal L2 white-box targeted gradient
Local Search Attack (LSA) [136] individual optimal L0 black-box targeted, untargeted gradient
Natural Evolutionary Strategies (NES) [86] individual optimal L∞ black-box targeted approximation
Boundary Attack (BA) [15] individual optimal L2 black-box targeted, untargeted decision
CW Attack [23] individual optimal L0 , L2 , L∞ white-box targeted, untargeted gradient
GenAttack [3] individual optimal L2 , L∞ black-box targeted decision
BIM and ILCM [98] individual optimal L∞ white-box untargeted gradient
Momentum Iterative Method (M-BIM) [44] individual optimal L∞ white-box, black-box untargeted gradient
Zeroth-Order Optimization (ZOO) [31] individual optimal L2 black-box targeted, untargeted transfer, score
Hot-Cold Attack [152] individual optimal L2 white-box targeted gradient
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [123] individual optimal L1 , L∞ white-box targeted gradient
UPSET [156] universal optimal L2 black-box targeted gradient
ANGRI [156] individual optimal L2 black-box targeted gradient
Elastic-Net Attack (EAD) [30] individual optimal L1 white-box targeted, untargeted gradient
Hop-Skip-Jump Attack (HSJ) [27] individual optimal L2 , L∞ black-box targeted, untargeted decision
Robust Physical Perturbations (RP2) [51] individual physical L1 , L2 white-box targeted gradient
Ground-Truth Attack [20] individual optimal L1 , L∞ white-box targeted gradient
OptMargin [76] individual optimal L01, L2 , L∞ white-box targeted gradient
One-Pixel Attack [171] individual visible L0 black-box targeted, untargeted decision
BPDA [5] individual optimal L2, L∞ black-box untargeted, targeted approximation
SPSA [183] individual optimal L∞ black-box untargeted approximation
Spatially Transformed Network (stAdv) [189] individual optimal custom white-box targeted gradient
AdvGAN [188] individual optimal L2 grey-box, black-box targeted gradient
Houdini [34] individual optimal L2 , L∞ black-box targeted gradient
Adversarial Transformation Networks (ATNs) [9] individual optimal L∞ white-box targeted gradient
* The axis Attacker’s Influence is not present in Table 1 because it does not depend of any aforementioned attack algorithm. Similarly, the
axis Attack Computation is not also present because, except from FGSM and L-BFGS, all other attacks mentioned in Table 1 have their
respective perturbations computed iterativelly.
4 DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
The menace of adversarial images has encouraged the scientific community to elaborate several
approaches to defend classification models. However, design such countermeasures has shown to be
a difficult task once adversarial inputs are solutions to an optimization problem that is non-linear and
non-convex. Since good theoretical tools for describing the solutions to these optimization problems
do not exist, it is very hard to put forward a theoretical argument ensuring a defense strategy will
be efficient against adversarial examples [97]. Therefore, the existing defense mechanisms have
some limitations in the sense that they can provide robustness against attacks in specific threat
models. The design of a robust machine learning model against all types of adversarial images and
other examples is still an open research problem [26, p. 27].
4.1 Taxonomy of Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
This section categorizes the defenses against adversarial attacks using a novel taxonomy composed
of two different axes, namely (i) defense objective and (ii) defense approach.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: September 2020.
12 Machado, et al.
4.1.1 Defense Objective. According to its main objetive, a defense can be (i) proactive or (ii) reactive.
Proactive defenses aim to turn classification models more robust to adversarial images. A model is
considered robust when it is able to correctly classify an adversarial image as if it were a legitimate
image. On the other hand, reactive defenses focus on detecting adversarial images by acting as
a filter that identifies malicious images before they reach the classifier. The detected images are
usually either discarted or sent to a recovery procedure.
4.1.2 Defense Aproach. Defenses can adopt different approaches when protecting models against
adversarial images. Each approach groups a set of similar procedures, which can range from
brute force solutions to preprocessing techniques. Based on a systematic review of literature,
this paper also categorizes the most relevant proactive and reactive countermeasures according
to their operational approach, which can be: (i) gradient masking, (ii) auxiliary detection models,
(iii) statistical methods, (iv) preprocessing techniques. (v) ensemble of classifiers and (vi) proximity
measurements.
Gradient Masking: defenses based on gradient masking (effect also known as obfuscated gradi-
ent [5]) produce, sometimes unintentionally, models containing smoother gradients that hinders
optimization-based attack algorithms from finding wrong directions in space, i.e. without useful
gradients for generating adversarial examples. According to Athalye et al. [5], defenses based
on gradient masking can be organized in: (i) shattered gradients, (ii) stochastic gradients and (iii)
exploding/vanishing gradients.
• Shattered gradients: are caused by non-differentiable defenses, thus introducing nonexistent or
incorrect gradients;
• Stochastic gradients: are caused by randomized proactive/reactive defenses or randomized pre-
processing on inputs before being fed to the classifier. This strategy of gradient masking usually
leads an adversarial attack to incorrectly estimate the true gradient;
• Exploding/vanishing gradients: are caused by defenses formed by very deep architectures, usually
consisting of multiple iterations of a neural network evaluation, where the output of one layer is
fed as input of the next layer.
Fig. 5. Adversarial training increases the robustness of classifiers by training them using an augmented
training dataset containing adversarial images. Adapted from Shen et al. [161].
Basically, there are many countermeasures based on different strategies of gradient masking, as
can be seen in Table 2. However, two distinct strategies are frequently mentioned by related work
in literature, which in turn make them relevant to describe in more details: (i) Adversarial Training
and (ii) Defensive Distillation.
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Defenses based on adversarial training are usually considered in literature a brute force approach
to protect against adversarial examples. Essentially, the main objetive of adversarial training is
to make a classification model more robust by training it in a dataset containing legitimate and
adversarial images. Formally, given a tuple X = (x ,y), where x is a legitimate image, y the class x
belongs to andT a training dataset having only the tuple X 6, such asT = {X }, an adversarial image
x ′ is crafted from x by an attack algorithm A, thus forming a new tuple X ′ that will have the same
label y of the clean image x , such that X ′ = {x ′,y},x ′ = A(x). Afterwards, the training dataset T is
augmented with X ′ and now contains two image tuples: T ′ = {X ,X ′}. The learning model is then
retrained using the training dataset T ′, resulting in a theoretically stronger model (see Figure 5).
Despite the good results adversarial training has presented in several works [66, 85, 90, 99, 123,
175, 180, 200], this gradient masking approach has basically two issues. The first issue is related to
the strong coupling adversarial training has with the attack algorithm used during the training
process. Retraining a model with adversarial training does not produce a generic model which
is able to resist against evasions of adversarial images generated by a different attack algorithm
not used in the training process. In order to have a more generic model, it would be necessary
to elaborate a training dataset T with a massive amount of adversarial images generated using
different attack algorithms and amounts of disturbance. Therefore, the second issue concerning
adversarial training raises: this is a procedure computationally inefficient, given two facts: (i) the
great number of adversarial images that must be crafted from different attacks, which in turn does
not guarantee robustness against adversarial images generated from more complex algorithms
and (ii) after generating these malicious images, the model must train using a much larger dataset,
which exponentially grows the training time. A robust defense method must be decoupled from
any attack algorithm to increase its generalization. Notwithstanding the drawbacks, Madry et al.
[123] proposed training on adversarial samples crafted using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
attack which is, by the time of this writing, the most promising defense present in literature, since
it has shown robustness to various types of attacks in both white-box and black-box settings [187].
However, their method is not model-agnostic and, due to computational complexities, it has not
been tested on large-scale datasets such as ImageNet [133].
Defensive Distillation, in turn, is a proactive defense initially proposed by Papernot et al. [148].
This countermeasure is inspired by a technique based on transfer of knowledge among learning
models known as distillation [80]. In learning distillation, the knowledge acquired by a complex
model, after being trained using a determined dataset, is transfered to a simpler model. In a similar
way, defensive distillation firstly trains a model f using a dataset containing samples X and labels
Y with a temperature t , resulting as output a probabilistic vector f (X ). The label set Y is then
replaced by the probabilistic vector f (X ) and a model f d with the same architecture of f is created
and trained with the sample set X , but now using as labels the novel label set f (X ). By the end of
training, the destilled probabilistic output f d (X ) is produced. Figure 6 depicts the schematic model
of defensive distillation.
Defenses based on gradient masking usually produce models containing smoother gradients in
certain regions of space, making harder for the attacker to find promising directions to perturb an
image. However, the attacker can instead use an non-differentiable attack, such as BPDA [5] or SPSA
[183] as well as perform a black-box attack by training a surrogate model. This surrogate model
reproduces the behaviour of the targeted model, since the attacker queries it using images carefully
crafted by him and watches the outputs the targeted model gives. Then, the attacker takes advantage
of the transferibility property of adversarial examples by using the gradients of the surrogate model
6For didactic purposes, consider the training dataset T formed by only one image.
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Fig. 6. Schematic model of defensive distillation [148].
in order to craft the images that will also lead the target model to misclassifications [64]. Section
5.7 gives more information regarding the transferability property of adversarial examples.
Auxiliary Detection Models (ADMs). A defense based on ADMs is, usually, a reactive method
that, basically, makes use of adversarial training to elaborate an auxiliary binary model that will act
as a filter after being trained, checking whether an input image is legitimate or adversarial before
sending it to the application classifier f . Works such as Gong et al., Grosse et al., Metzen et al. and
Chen et al. [28, 62, 68, 127] have proposed defenses based on ADMs.
Grosse et al. [68] have adapted an application classifier f to also act as a ADM, training it in
a dataset containing n + 1 classes. The procedure followed by the authors consists of generating
adversarial images x ′i for each legitimate image (xi ,yj ) that belongs to the training set T , where
i ≤ |T | ×m (wherem is the number of attack algorithms used) and j ≤ n. After the generation of
adversarial images, it has been formed a new training set T1, where T1 = T ∪{(x ′i ,n+1), i ≤ |T |×m}.
n + 1 is the label assigned to an adversarial image. Finally, the model f has been trained using the
T1 set.
Gong et al. [62] have elaborated a defense similar to Grosse et al., but instead of adapting the
application classifier to predict adversarial images in a class n+1, the authors have built and trained
an ADM to filter out adversarial images X ′ (crafted by FGSM and JSMA attacks) from the legitimate
images X , using a training dataset T1, formed from T . Formally, T1 = {(xi , 1) : i ∈ |T |} ∪ {(x ′i , 0) :
i ≤ |T | ×m}.
In Metzen et al. [127], the representation outputs of the hidden layers of a DNN have been used
for training some ADMs, in a way similar of what has been made in [62]. The authors have named
these ADMs subnetworks and fixed them among specific hidden layers of a DNN in order to detect
adversarial images. In this work were performed experiments using the attack algorithms FGSM,
BIM, and DeepFool.
Finally, Chen et al. [28] have elaborated a detection and reforming architecture called ReabsNet.
When Reabsnet receives an image x , it uses an ADM (represented by a DNN trained by adversarial
training) to check whether x is legitimate or adversarial. In case of being classified as legitimate
by the ADM, Reabsnet sends x to the application classifier. However, in case of being classified
as adversarial, x is sent by ReabsNet to an iterative process, that reforms the image x while it is
classified by adversarial by the ADM. In the end of the reform process, the image x is finally sent
to the application classifier.
Statistical Methods: Some works such as Grosse et al. and Feinman et al. [54, 68] have per-
formed statistical comparisons among the distributions of legitimate and adversarial images. Grosse
et al. have elaborated a reactive defense method that has performed an approximation for the
hypothesis test MMD (Maximum Mean Discrepancy) with the Fisher’s permutation test in order
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to verify whether a legitimate dataset S1 belongs to the same distribution of another dataset S2,
which may contain adversarial images. Formally, given two datasets S1 and S2, it is initially defined
a = MMD(S1,S2). Later, there is a permutation of elements of S1 and S2 in two new datasets S′1
and S′2, and it is defined b = MMD(S′1,S′2). If a < b, the null hypothesis is rejected and then it is
concluded that the two datasets belong to different distributions. This process is repeated several
times and the p-value is defined as the fraction of the number of times which the null hypothesis
was rejected.
Feinman et al. [54] have also proposed a reactive defense called Kernel Density Estimation (KDE).
KDE makes use of Gaussian Mixture Models7 to analyze the outputs of the logits layer of a DNN
and to verify whether the input images belong to the same distribution of legitimate images. Given
an image x classified as a label y, the KDE estimates the probability of x according to Equation 6:
KDE(x) = 1Xy  ∑s ∈Xy exp ©­«
Fn−1(x) − Fn−1(s)2
σ 2
ª®¬ (6)
where Xy is the training dataset containing images pertaining the class y and Fn−1(x) is the logits
output Z related to input x . Therefore, the detector is built by the selection of a threshold τ which
classifies x as adversarial if KDE(x) < τ or legitimate, otherwise.
Preprocessing Techniques. Other works have elaborated countermeasures based on prepro-
cessing techniques, such as image transformations [71, 191], GANs [155, 161], noise layers [113],
denoising autoencoders [70] and dimensionality reduction [79, 104, 195]. In the following, each
work will be explained in more details.
Xie et al. [191] have elaborated a proactive defense called Random Resizing and Padding (RRP)
that inserts a resizing and a padding layer in the beginning of a DNN architecture. The resizing
layer alters the dimensions of a input image, and later, the padding layer inserts null values in
random positions on the surrondings of the resized image. In the end of the padding procedure, the
resized image is classified by the proactive model.
Guo et al. [71] have applied various transformations in input images before classification, such as
cropping and rescaling, bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, total variance minimization (TVM)
and image quilting. Guo et al. have implemented TVM as a defense by randomly picking pixels
from an input and performing iterative optimization to find an image whose colors are consistent
with the randomly picked pixels. On the other hand, image quilting has involved reconstructing an
image using small patches taken from the training database by using a nearest neighbor procedure
(e.g. kNN). The intuition behind image quilting is to construct an image that is free from adversarial
perturbations, since quilting only uses clean patches to reconstruct the image [187]. The authors
claimed that TVM and image quilting have presented the best results when protecting the classifier
since both (i) introduce randomness, (ii) are non-differentiable operations which hinders the attacker
to compute the model gradient and (iii) are model-agnostic which means the model does not need
to be retrained or fine-tuned.
Shen et al. [161] have proposed a proactive defense method which have adapted a GAN to
preprocess input images before they be sent to the application classifier. Samangouei et al. [155] have
also elaborated a defense based on a GAN framework that uses a generative transformation network
G which projects an input image x onto the range of the generator by minimizing the reconstruction
error | |G(z) − x | |2. After the transformation, the classifier is fed with the reconstructionG(z). Since
the generator was trained to model the unperturbed training data distribution, the authors claimed
7Gaussian Mixture Models are unsupervised learning models that clusters data by representing sub-populations, using
normal distributions, within a general population.
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this added step results in a substantial reduction of any potential adversarial noise. In turn, Liu
et al. [113] have adopted an approach based on noise layers. These noise layers have been inserted
among the hidden layers of a CNN in order to apply a gaussian noise randomly crafted on each
vector of the input image. According to the authors, this procedure avoids gradient-based attacks.
Gu and Rigazio [70] have elaborated the Deep Contractive Networks (DCNs), which are proactive
defense methods that make use denoising autoencoders and evolutionary algorithms as alternatives
to remove perturbations from adversarial images.
In addition, there are countermeasures that preprocesses input images using dimensionality
reduction techniques [79, 104, 195]. These works are based on the hypothesis that, by reducing the
dimensions of an input, the likelihood of an attacker creating a perturbation that can affect the
classifier’s performance decreases, given the fact the attack algorithm will have less information
concerning the hyperspace of the image [195]. Keeping this hypothesis in mind, Hendrycks and
Gimpel [79] have elaborated a reactive defense based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA)8. The
authors have inferred that adversarial images assign greater weights on larger principal components
and smaller weights on initial principal components. Li and Li [104] have applied PCA on values
produced by the convolution layers of a DNN and then used a cascate classifier to detect adversarial
images. The cascate classifier C classifies an image x as legitimate only if all its subclassifiers Ci
classify x as legitimate, but rejects x if some classifier Ci reject x . In this work, the L-BFGS attack
has been used to perform the experiments.
Xu et al. [195] have introduced Feature Squeezing, which is reactive defense that makes use of
two techniques to reduce de dimensionality of a input image: (i) color bit reduction and (ii) spatial
smoothing. According to the authors, these techniques have been chosen since they complement
each other by treating two different types of perturbation. The bit reduction aims to eliminate
small perturbations by covering various pixels, while spatial smoothing aims to eliminate big
perturbations by covering some pixels. During the detection process, Feature Squeezing generates
two reduced versions of an input image x : (i) xˆ1, which represents image x with the color bits
reduced and (ii) xˆ2, which represents x reduced with spatial smoothing. Later, Feature Squeezing
sends the images x , xˆ1 e xˆ2 to be classified by a DNN f and compares the softmax outputs f (x), f (xˆ1)
e f (xˆ2) using the L1 metric. If the L1 metric exceeds a predefined threshold τ , Feature Squeezing
classifies x as an adversarial example and discarts it. Figure 7 depicts this workflow.
Fig. 7. The Feature Squeezing workflow [195].
Ensemble of Classifiers. Defenses based on ensemble of classifiers are countermeasures formed
by two or more classification models that can be chosen in runtime. This approach is based on
the assumption that each model reciprocally compensates the weaknesses other model eventually
might have when classifying a given input image [77]. Works such as Abbasi and Gagné, Strauss
et al., Tramèr et al. and Sengupta et al. [1, 159, 170, 180] have adopted different techniques to
8PCA is a dimensionality reduction technique that reduces, by appling a linear transformation, a set of points inn-dimensional
space to a k-dimensional space, where k ≤ n.
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elaborate defenses based on ensemble of classifiers. Sengupta et al. [159] have used a bayesian
algorithm to chose a optimal model from an ensemble so as to minimize the chances of evasion
and, at the same time, maximize the correct predictions on legitimate images. Abbasi and Gagné
[1] have formed ensembles of specialist models which detects and classifies an input image by
majority vote. Strauss et al. [170] have made empirical evaluations based on four types of different
ensembles and trainings. Tramèr et al. [180], in turn, have used a variation of adversarial training
to train the main classifier with adversarial images crafted by an ensemble of DNNs.
ProximityMeasurements. There are otherworks such as Cao andGong, Carrara et al., Machado.
et al., Meng and Chen, Papernot and McDaniel which have proposed defenses based on proximity
measurements among legitimate and adversarial images to the decision boundary. Papernot and
McDaniel [144] have elaborated an proactive defense method called Deep k-Nearest Neighbors
(DkNN), which makes use of a variation of the kNN algorithm9 to compute uncertainty and
reliability metrics from the proximity among the hidden representations of training and input
images, obtained from each layer of a DNN. The labels representing points in space of training
images are analyzed after the input image goes through all the layers of the DNN. In case of the
prediction related to the input x , given by the DNN, be in accordance with the labels representing
the nearest training images to x , the uncertainty metric tends to be small. In contrast, in case of the
labels of the training images be divergent among them, the uncertainty metric tends to be large
[141]. Figure 8 depicts the DkNN operation.
Fig. 8. The DkNN computes uncertainty and reliability metrics to support a prediction made by a DNN for a
given input image x , by performing a search among the training images with internal representations closest
to x [141].
Cao and Gong [18] have also adopted an approach based on proximity metrics to elaborate a
proactive countermeasure, called Region-based Classification (RC). RC is a variation of the kNN
which defines a region R in hyperspace, having as centroid an input image x , assigning it a label
corresponding to the class which most intersects the area of this region R. Formally, for a given
input image x and a DNN f that splits the hyperspace in C distinct regions R = {R1,R2, · · · ,RC }
(beingC the number of classes and Ri the predicted class for f (x)), it is created a hypercube B(x , r )
around x (being x the centroid of B(x , r )) with length r . Ai (B(x , r )) is the area of hypercube B(x , r )
that intersects the region Ri . The classifier RC formed from f is defined as RCf ,r and its prediction
for x is based on the region Ri which has the largest intersection with the area of hypercube, namely
RCf ,r = argmaxi (Ai (B(x , r ))).
9kNN stands for k-Nearest Neighbors. It is an supervised classification algorithm that assigns, to a given input x , the most
frequent class c among the k nearest training samples from x , according to a certain distance metric.
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Carrara et al. [25] have introduced a reactive defense that resembles somehow the DkNN
architecture [144]. The reactive method proposed by Carrara et al., at first, make use of a DNN f
to classify an input image x . Afterwards, the inner representations regarding image x , obtained
from a hidden layer of f (such layer is chosen empirically), are used by an kNN algorithm to
perform a search in the training dataset in order to recover the k images containing the most similar
representations to the corresponding representations of x . Therefore, it is obtained a confidence
metric conf related to the prediction f (x), where conf is computed based on the score of the
kNN algorithm. If the confidence is below a predefined threshold, the input image is classified as
adversarial and discarted afterwards; otherwise, the prediction f (x) is valid with a confidence level
of c .
In turn, Meng and Chen [126] have proposed MagNet: a non-deterministic and reactive archi-
tecture composed of two defense layers: (i) a detection layer, which rejects adversarial images
containing large perturbations and, for this reason, considered further from the decision boundary,
and (ii) the reform layer, which reforms the images derived from the detection layer as an attempt
to remove any existing perturbations that are still present in them. According to the authors, the
reform layer acts as a "magnet", drawing the adversarial images that evaded the detection layer to
the regions of the decision boundary corresponding to their respective correct classes. For both
layers, MagNet randomly chooses from a repository two defense components, implemented as
autoencoders (trained beforehand using legitimate images): one autoencoder for the detection layer
and the other for the reformer layer. The non-deterministic choice of the components is, according
to the authors, inspired on cryptography techniques to reduce the chances of evasions.
In Vorobeychik and Kantarcioglu [184] is said that a defense based on randomness may be an
inportant strategy to secure machine learning algorithms. Since randomness can significantly
increase the size of perturbations and the computational cost needed to craft adversarial images,
Machado. et al. [122] have extended the non-deterministic effect of MagNet by proposing a defense
called MultiMagNet, which randomly chooses multiple defense components at runtime instead of
just one, how is originally made by MagNet. In a way similar to MagNet, the MultiMagNet’s defense
components have also been implemented as autoencoders trained on legitimate images. Later, the
authors have split the MultiMagNet’s architecture into two stages, namely (i) calibration stage and
(ii) deployment stage. In calibration stage, MultiMagNet makes use of a validation dataset to find
the best set of hyperparameters. Once calibrated, MultiMagNet goes to the (ii) deployment stage,
where it analyzes input images in order to protect the application classifier against adversarial
examples. The authors havemade a comparative studywithMagNet using legitimate and adversarial
images crafted by FGSM, BIM DeepFool and CW attacks, and concluded the increasing of the
non-deterministic effect by choosing multiple components can lead to better defense architectures.
Table 2 makes a comprehensive overview of some relevant defenses against adversarial attacks
in Computer Vision available in literature, following the taxonomy presented in Section 4.1. It also
shows which of them have already been circumvented by mentioning the corresponding works on
adversarial attacks.
5 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Developing an understanding about the existence and the properties of adversarial examples, by
reasoning why they affect the prediction of machine learning models, is usually the first step
taken into consideration when elaborating attacks and defenses in Adversarial Machine Learning
[121]. The vulnerability that CNNs and other machine learning algorithms present before the
malicious effects of adversarial attacks is popularly known as Clever Hans Effect, term somewhat
popularized by the advent of CleverHans library [142]. This effect has been named after a german
horse called Hans. His owner used to claim Hans has owned intellectual abilities by answering
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Table 2. Summary of some relevant defenses against adversarial attacks in Computer Vision.
Defense / Work
and Reference Objective Approach
Robustness Claims Bypassed by **
Attack algorithms Attacker’s knowledge*
Thermometer Encoding [17] Proactive Preprocessing PGD WB, BB Athalye et al. [5]
VectorDefense [89] Proactive Preprocessing BIM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW, PGD WB, GB —
PixelDefend [166] Proactive, Reactive Preprocessing, Proximity FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, CW WB Athalye et al. [5]
Mustafa et al. [134] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, MI-BIM, DeepFool, CW WB, BB —
Prakash et al. [149] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, JSMA, DeepFool, L-BFGS, CW WB Athalye and Carlini [4]
SAP [42] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM WB Athalye et al. [5]
Feinman et al. [54] Reactive Statistics FGSM, BIM, JSMA, CW WB Carlini and Wagner [21]
Carrara et al. [25] Reactive Proximity L-BFGS, FGSM WB —
D3 algorithm [133] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, DeepFool, CW, UAP WB BB, GB —
RRP [191] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, DeepFool, CW WB Uesato et al. [183]
RSE [113] Proactive Preprocessing, Ensemble CW WB, BB —
Bhagoji et al. [12] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM WB Carlini and Wagner [21]
Li and Li [105] Reactive Preprocessing, Statistics L-BFGS WB Carlini and Wagner [21]
ReabsNet [28] Reactive ADM, Preprocessing FGSM, DeepFool, CW WB —
Zheng and Hong [202] Reactive Statistics, Proximity FGSM, BIM, DeepFool BB, GB —
DeT [103] Proactive Preprocessing, Ensemble FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, CW BB, GB —
Deep Defense [196] Proactive Gradient Masking DeepFool WB —
Grosse et al. [68] Reactive Statistics FGSM, JSMA WB, BB Carlini and Wagner [21]
RCE [140] Reactive Gradient Masking FGSM, BIM, ILCM, JSMA, CW WB, BB —
NIC [120] Reactive ADM, Proximity FGSM, BIM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW WB, BB —
Cao and Gong [18] Proactive Proximity FGSM, BIM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW WB He et al. [76]
Hendrycks and Gimpel [79] Reactive Preprocessing FGSM WB Carlini and Wagner [21]
Feature Distillation [116] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, CW, BPDA WB, BB, GB —
LID [121] Reactive Proximity FGSM, BIM, JSMA, CW WB Athalye et al. [5]
Cohen et al. [37] Reactive Proximity FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW WB —
BAT [186] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, PGD WB —
Madry et al. [123] Proactive Gradient Masking PGD WB, BB Athalye et al. [5]***
MALADE [167] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, PGD, M-BIM, EAD, BPDA, EOT, BA WB, BB —
S2SNet [56] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, BIM, CW WB, GB —
Gong et al. [62] Reactive ADM FGSM, JSMA WB Carlini and Wagner [21]
Metzen et al. [127] Reactive ADM FGSM, BIM, DeepFool WB Carlini and Wagner [21]
Das et al. [40] Proactive Preprocessing, Ensemble FGSM, DeepFool WB —
CCNs [150] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, DeepFool WB, BB —
DCNs [70] Proactive Gradient Masking, Preprocessing L-BFGS WB —
Na et al. [135] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, BIM, ILCM, CW WB, BB —
MagNet [126] Reactive Proximity, Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, CW BB, GB Carlini and Wagner [22]
MultiMagNet [122] Reactive Proximity, Preprocessing, Ensemble FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, CW WB, BB. GB —
WSNNS [46] Proactive Proximity FGSM, CW, PGD BB, GB —
ME-Net [197] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, PGD, CW, BA, SPSA WB, BB —
SafetyNet [118] Reactive ADM FGSM, BIM, JSMA, DeepFool WB, BB —
Defensive Distillation [148] Proactive Gradient Masking JSMA WB Carlini and Wagner [23]
Papernot and McDaniel [143] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, JSMA WB, BB —
Feature Squeezing [195] Reactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, JSMA, CW WB He et al. [77]
TwinNet [153] Reactive ADM, Ensemble UAP WB —
Abbasi and Gagné [1] Reactive Ensemble FGSM, DeepFool WB He et al. [77]
Strauss et al. [170] Proactive Ensemble FGSM, BIM WB —
Tramèr et al. [180] Proactive Gradient Masking, Ensemble FGSM, ILCM, BIM WB, BB Alzantot et al. [3]
MTDeep [159] Proactive Ensemble FGSM, CW WB —
Defense-GAN [155] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, CW WB, BB Athalye et al. [5]
APE-GAN [161] Proactive Preprocessing L-BFGS, FGSM, DeepFool, JSMA, CW WB Carlini and Wagner [22]
Zantedeschi et al. [200] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, JSMA, VAT [129] WB, BB Carlini and Wagner [22]
Liu et al. [111] Reactive Gradient Masking FGSM, GDA [13], POE [185] WB —
Liang et al. [106] Reactive Preprocessing FGSM, DeepFool, CW WB —
Parseval Networks [35] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, BIM BB —
Guo et al. [71] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, CW BB, GB Dong et al. [45]
HGD [107] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM WB, BB Dong et al. [45]
ALP [90] Proactive Gradient Masking PGD WB Engstrom et al. [48]
Sinha et al. [164] Proactive Gradient Masking FGSM, BIM, PGD WB —
Fortified Networks [101] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, PGD WB, BB —
DeepCloak [57] Proactive Preprocessing L-BFGS, FGSM, JSMA WB —
Xie et al. [193] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, BIM, M-BIM, PGD WB, BB Kurakin et al. [100]
DDSA [8] Proactive Preprocessing FGSM, M-BIM, CW, PGD WB, BB, GB —
ADV-BNN [114] Proactive Gradient Masking PGD WB, BB —
DkNN [144] Proactive Proximity FGSM, BIM, CW WB Sitawarin and Wagner [165]
*WB: White-box; BB: Black-box; GB: Grey-box.
** The "—" symbol means that it has not been found in literature any work on adversarial attacks that has circunvented the respective defense.
***Despite beign evaded in Athalye et al. [5], the method proposed by Madry et al. is considered as the state-of-the-art defense in literature [5].
arithmetic questions that people made to it by tapping its hoof the number of times corresponding
to the correct answer. However, after several experiments conducted on Hans, psychologists have
concluded in fact the horse has not been solving arithmetic questions, but somehow it has developed
the ability to identify behavioural signals made by the crowd, such as clappings and yielings, that
warned it out to stop hitting its hoof on the ground. In other words, Hans has not developed an
adaptive intelligence, but actually means of perceiving and interpreting its surroundings in order
to correctly answer the questions.
Similar to Hans, learning models are usually able to give correct answers to complex problems,
such as image recognition and classification, but without really learning from training data, what
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make them susceptible to adversarial attacks [59, 97]. Despite the absence of an unanimous accepted
explanation for the adversarial paradox10, this section will describe some common hypotheses
present in literature regarding the existence of adversarial images.
5.1 High Non-Linearity Hypothesis
Szegedy et al. [175] firstly concerned about the existence of adversarial examples. The authors have
argued that adversarial examples exist due to the high non-linearity of deep neural networks, what
contributes to the formation of low probability pockets in the data manifold that are hard to reach
by sampling an input space around a given example (see Figure 9a). According to Gu and Rigazio
and Song et al. [70, 166], the emergence of such pockets is given chiefly due to some deficiencies
of objective functions, training procedures and datasets limited in size and diversity of training
samples, thus leading models to poor generalizations.
5.2 Linearity Hypothesis
Goodfellow et al. [66] contradicted the non-linearity hypothesis of Szegedy et al. by assuming
DNNs have a very linear behaviour caused by several activation functions like ReLU and sigmoid
that perpetuates small perturbed inputs in a same wrong direction. As an attempt to underlie their
explanation, the authors have elaborated the FGSM attack. Fawzi et al. [53] said that the robustness
of a classifier is independent of the training procedure used and the distance between two classes
is larger in high-order classifiers than in linear ones, suggesting that it is harder to find adversarial
examples in deeper models. This explanation also goes against the non-linearity hypothesis of
Szegedy et al.. However, in contrast to the linearity hypothesis, Tabacof and Valle [176] has found
evidences the phenomenon of adversarial paradox may be a more complex problem, since results
obtained from empirical experiments have suggested that shallow classifiers present a greater
susceptibility to adversarial examples than deeper models. Despite some works that criticize the
linearity hypothesis, some relevant attacks (such as FGSM [66] and DeepFool [132]) and defenses
(such as Thermometer Encoding [17]) have been based on it.
5.3 Boundary Tilting Hypothesis
Tanay and Griffin [177], on the other hand, have rejected the linear hypothesis proposed by
Goodfellow et al. by assuming that it is "insufficient" and "unconvincing". They have proposed
instead a boundary tilting perspective to explain the adversarial paradox. This assumption, according
to the authors, is more related to the explanation given by Szegedy et al., where a learnt class
boundary lies close to the training samples manifold, but this learnt boundary is "tilted" with
respect to this training manifold. Thereby, adversarial images can be generated by perturbing
legitimate samples towards the classification boundary until they cross it. The amount of required
perturbation is smaller as the tilting degree decreases, producing high-confidence and misleading
adversarial examples, containing visually imperceptible perturbations. The authors also believe
this effect might be a result of an overfitted model. Figure 9b shows a simplified illustration of the
boundary tilting perspective compared with the Szegedy et al. hypothesis.
5.4 High Dimensional Manifold
Gilmer et al. [61], in concordance with other works such as Mahloujifar et al., Shafahi et al. and
Fawzi et al. [52, 125, 160], said that the phenomenon of adversarial examples is result from the high
10Tanay and Griffin [177] have defined this paradox as the disparity between high performance classification of state-
of-the-art deep learning models against their susceptibility to small perturbations that differ so close from one class to
another.
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Fig. 9. Comparison between the Szegedy et al. and Tanay and Griffin’s hypotheses [177]. a) Szegedy et al.’s
hypothesis lies on the assumption that an image space is densely filled with low probability adversarial pockets.
Similarly, b) Tanay and Griffin’s hypothesis indicates the existence of tilted boundaries what contributes to
the emergence of adversarial examples.
dimensional nature of the data manifold. In order to show evidences, Gilmer et al. have created a
synthetic dataset for better controlling their experiments, and used it afterwards to train a model.
After training it, the authors observed that inputs correctly classified by the model were close to
nearby misclassified adversarial inputs, meaning that learning models are necessarily vulnerable to
adversarial examples, independently of the training procedure used. At last, based on empirical
results, Gilmer et al. have also denied the assumption that states adversarial examples lie on a
different distribution when compared to legitimate data [60, 126, 155, 166].
5.5 Lack of Enough Training Data
Schmidt et al. [158] claim learning models must generalize in a strong sense, i.e. with the help of
robust optimization, in order to achieve robustness. Basically, the authors observed the existence
of adversarial examples is not necessarily a shortcoming of specific classification models, but an
unavoidable consequence of working in a statistical setting. After gathering some empirical results,
the authors concluded that, currently, there are no working approaches which attain adversarial
robustness mainly because existing datasets are not large enough to train strong classifiers.
5.6 Non-Robust Features Hypothesis
Ilyas et al. [87] have provided a different explanation based on the assumption the existence
of adversarial perturbations does not necessarily indicate flaws regarding learning models or
training procedures, but actually regarding images’ features. By taking into account the human’s
perception, the authors split the features into (i) robust features, that lead models to correctly
predict the true class even when they are adversarially perturbed, and (ii) non-robust features,
which are features derived from patterns in the data distribution that are highly predictive yet
brittle, incomprehensible to humans and more susceptible to be perturbed by an adversary. In order
to underlie their assumption, the authors proposed constructing a novel dataset formed by images
containing solely robust features which have been filtered out from the original input images by
using the logits layer of a trained DNN. Then, this dataset has been used to train another DNN that
has been used to perform a comparative study. The results has led the authors to find evidences
that adversarial examples might really arise as a result of the presence of non-robust features, what
goes in a opposite direction of what it is commonly believed: that adversarial examples are not
necessarily tied to the standard training framework. Their conclusion is somehow related to the
Schmidt et al. [158] work.
5.7 Explanations for Adversarial Transferability
As briefly mentioned in Section 4.1.2, adversarial examples make heavy use of the transferability
property to drastically affect the performance of learning models even in more realistic scenarios,
where the attacker does not have access to much or any information regarding the target classifier,
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as is simulated by grey and black-box settings. Adversarial transferability can be formally defined
as the property that some adversarial samples have to mislead not only a target model f , but also
other models f ′ even when their architectures greatly differ [146]. Papernot et al. [145] have split
adversarial transferability into two main categories: (i) intra-technique transferability, which occurs
between two models that share a similar learning algorithm (e.g. DNNs) and are trained using
the same dataset, however initialized with different parameters (e.g. transferability between two
DNN architectures, such as VGG-16 and ResNet-152); (ii) cross-technique transferability, that occurs
between two models which respectivelly belong to different learning algorithms (e.g. DNN and
SVM), where can even perform different learning tasks, such as image classification and object
detection (see Appendix 8 for more details). According to Wiyatno et al. [187], understanding the
transferability phenomenon is critical not only to explain the existence of adversarial examples,
but to create safer machine learning models.
Some assumptions have arisen in literature as an attempt to explain adversarial transferability.
The linearity hypothesis assumed by Goodfellow et al. [66] suggests the direction of perturbations
may be the crucial factor that allows the adversarial effect transfer among models, since the
disturbances end up acquiring similar functions through training. Tramèr et al. [181], in turn, have
hypothesized if adversarial transferability is actually a consequence of the intersection between the
adversarial subspace of two different models. By estimating the number of orthogonal adversarial
directions using a techinique called Gradient Aligned Adversarial Subspace (GAAS), they found that
the separating distance between the decision boundaries of two models was, on average, smaller
than the distances between any inputs to the decision boundaries, even on adversarially trained
models. This suggests their adversarial subspaces were overlapped. At last, they also concluded
that transferability is inherent to models that preserve non-robust properties when trying to learn
feature representations of the input space, what according to the authors is not a consequence of a
lack of robustness, but actually a intrinsic property of the learning algorithms themselves. Their
findings agreed with the works of Liu et al. [115] and Ilyas et al. [87].
6 PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING AND EVALUATING DEFENSES
Defending robustly against adversarial attacks is still an open question. Carlini et al. [19] assert
defenses often claim robustness against adversarial examples without carrying out common security
evaluations, what in fact contributes to the construction of brittle and limited architectures which
are rapidly broken by novel and adaptive attacks. For this reason, the authors have defined a basic
set of principles and methodologies that should be followed by both defenders and reviewers to
check whether a defense evaluation is thorough and follows currently accepted best practices.
This is crucial to prevent researchers from taking deceitful statements and conclusions about their
works. In the following are listed and briefly explained some basic and relevant principles based on
the Carlini et al.’s guide for properly evaluating general defenses. For further orientations, it is
recommended consult the authors’ paper [19].
6.1 Define a Threat Model
A defense should always define a threat model where it states to be robust against adversarial attacks.
It is important the threat model be described in details, preferably following the taxonomy defined
in Section 3.2, so that reviewers and attackers can restrict their evaluations under the requirements
the defense affirms to be secure. For instance, a certain defense claims robustness under a threat
model formed by: evasive attacks conducted in a white-box scenario where adversarial examples
are generated by gradient and approximation-based attacks with L2 norm and perturbation size
less than 1.5. Based on this information, fair attackers which are interested in this defense must
follow exactly what is specified by this threat model when designing their attacks.
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6.2 Simulate Adaptive Adversaries
A good evaluation must test the limits of a defense by simulating adaptive adversaries which
make use of its threat model to elaborate strong attacks. All settings and attacks scenarios that
stand a chance to bypass the defense should be taken into consideration without exceptions. An
evaluation conducted only based on non-adaptive adversaries is of very limited utility since the
results produced by the experiments do not bring reliable conclusions that support the defense’s
claims and its robustness bounds. A good evaluation will not try to support or assist the defense’s
claims, but will try to break it under its threat model at all costs. Therefore, weak attack settings and
algorithms, such as FGSM attack11 must not be solely used. It is worth mentioning there are some
relevant libraries available online for helping researchers to perform evaluations by simulating
adaptive adversaries, such as CleverHans [142], Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) [139], Foolbox
[151], DEEPSEC [109] and AdvBox [67].
6.3 Develop Provable Lower Bounds of Robustness
Most works make use of empirical and heuristic evaluations to assess the robustness of their
defenses. However, provable approaches are preferred since they provide, when the proof is correct,
lower bounds of robustness which ensure the performance of the evaluated defense will never fall
below that level. Nevertheless, provable evaluations usually suffer from the lack of generalization,
since they get attached to the network architecture and a specific set of adversarial examples X,
crafted using a certain attack algorithm, that has been used in the experiments. This evaluation does
not give any proofs that extend for other adversarial examples x ′ < X, what makes the statement
less powerful. Circumvent these problems when developing provable lower bounds is an active
research path (see Section 7.1).
6.4 Perform Basic Sanity Tests
Sanity tests are important to identify anomalies and antagonic results that can lead authors to take
incorrect conclusions. Carlini et al. [19] has listed some basic sanity tests that should be run to
complement the experiments and support the results.
• Report model accuracy on legitimate samples: while the protection of learning models
against adversarial examples is a relevant security issue, a significant decrease on legitimate data
on behalf of increasing the robustness of the model might be unreasonable for scenarios where
the probability of an actual adversarial attack is low and the cost of a misclassification is not
high. For reactive defenses, it is important to evaluate how the rejection of perturbed samples
can affect the accuracy of the model on legitimate samples. An analysis of a Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve may be helpful to check how the choice of a threshold for rejecting
adversarial inputs can decrease the model’s clean accuracy;
• Iterative vs. sequential attacks: iterative attacks are more powerful than sequential attacks. If
adversarial examples crafted by a sequential algorithm are able to affect classification models
more than examples crafted by iterative ones, it can indicate that the iterative attack is not
properly calibrated;
• Increase the perturbation budget: attacks when allowed to produce larger amounts of distor-
tion in images usually fool classifiers more often than attacks with smaller perturbation budgets.
Therefore, if the attack success rate decreases as the perturbation budget increases, this attack
algorithm is likely flawed;
11FGSM originally was implemented to support the linearity hypothesis made in Goodfellow et al. [66]. For this and other
reasons related to the attack configurations, such as its sequential execution when computing perturbations, this attack is
considered weak and untrustworthy to fully test defenses, usually used only to run sanity tests (see Section 6.4).
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• Try brute force attacks: it can be an alternative in scenarios where the attacks do not succeed
very often. By performing a random search attack within the defense’s threat model can help
the attacker or reviewer to find adversarial examples which have not been found by standard
adversarial attacks, what indicates these algorithms must be somehow improved. Carlini et al.
recommend starting this sanity test by sampling random points at larger distances from the
legitimate input, limiting the search to strictly smaller distortions whenever an adversarial
example is found.
• White-box vs. black-box attacks: white-box attacks are generally more powerful than black-
box attacks, since the attacker has complete access to the model and its parameters. For this
reason, gradient-based attacks should, in principle, present better success rates. If gradient-based
attacks have worse performance when compared to other attack approaches, it can indicate the
defense is somehow performing a kind of gradient masking and the gradient-based attack needs
calibration.
• Attack similar undefended models: proactive and reactive defenses typically introduce a
couple of modifications in the networks in order to increase their robustness. However, it can
be worth trying remove these security components out from the model and evaluate it under
attacks without any protection. If the undefended model appears robust nevertheless, it can infer
that the defense itself is not actually protecting the model.
6.5 Releasing of Source Code
It is crucial that all source code used to implement the experiments and pre-trained models referred
in the defense’s paper, including even their hyperparameters, be available to the community through
online repositories so that interested reviewers can reproduce the evaluations made by the original
work and ensure their correctness.
7 DIRECTIONS OF FUTUREWORK
During the development of this paper, it has been noticed adversarial defenses are still in their
infancy, despite the impressive growth of published works in the last years. There are numerous
important questions waiting for answers, specially those referring to how defend robustly against
adversarial examples. This opens some promising research paths that will be detailed in the
following.
7.1 Development of Theoretical Lower Bounds of Robustness
Most defenses are limited to empirical evaluations and do not claim robustness to unknown attacks
[187]. Other works, in turn, devise theoretical robustness bounds which do not generalize to
different attacks and threat models studied. A promising research path is the investigation of
properties that can theoretically guarantee general lower bounds of robustness to adversarial
attacks (see Section 6.3).
7.2 Unanimously Explanations Concerning the Existence and Transferability of
Adversarial Examples
As can be seen in Section 5, there are already some explanations for the existence and transferability
of adversarial examples. However, none of them is universally accepted due to the lack of proofs.
Developing unanimously provable explanations for these phenomena is relevant for the field of
Adversarial Machine Learning, since they will guide future defenses to focus on solving the actual
flaw and help the community understand better the inner workings of deep learning models.
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7.3 Devising of Efficient Attack Algorithms
Crafting strong adversarial examples is computationally expensive even on vanilla datasets. Ap-
plications which count on small response times, such as the traffic signal recognition system of a
autonomous vehicle, require efficiency from attack algorithms when intercepting and perturbing
the inputs. Attacks in black-box environments also impose more difficulties to the attacker since
he usually has available only a limited number of queries to the oracle12 in order to generate the
perturbations. Regarding defenses, a good evaluation also needs testing numerous attacks, what can
be computationally infeasible depending on the algorithms and datasets used. Therefore, devising
strong and efficient adversarial attacks is a relevant research path for both fields of Adversarial
Machine Learning.
7.4 Comparison to Prior Work
As previously mentioned, a large amount of adversarial defenses emerges in literature, however
few of them perform a comparative study with other methods. A well-conducted study compar-
ing different security approaches could help fomenting results in addition to reveal promising
architectures for specific threat models.
7.5 Development of Hybrid Defense Architectures
It is worth mentioning as a encouraging research path the development of hybrid defenses. The term
hybrid defense stands for an architecture formed by different countermeasures which are organized
on individual processes, called modules. Each module would be responsable for performing some
security procedure according to the approach that represents it. On each module, a component
(represented by a defense or preprocessing method) would be randomly picked from a repository
when receiving the input image. For instance, a hybrid defense could consist of three modules: a (i)
reactive module, which randomly chooses a reactive defense from a repository to detect adversarial
images; a (ii) preprocessing module that randomly processes the detected adversarial images that
came from the reactive module, and a (iii) proactive module which similarly chooses at random
a proactive defense to finally classify the input image. To the best of knowledge, it has not been
found in literature any work that has adopted similar approach or study, what, in turn, make this
path open for future opportunities.
8 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Deep Learning models have revealed to be susceptible to attacks of adversarial nature despite
shown impressive abilities when solving complex cognitive problems, specially tasks related to
Computer Vision, such as image classification and recognition. This vulnerability severely menaces
the application of these learning algorithms in safety-critical scenarios, what in turn may jeopardize
the development of the field if this security issue persists in the future. The scientific community
has been struggling to find alternatives to defend against adversarial attacks practically since this
problem was firstly spotted by the work of Szegedy et al. [175]. The numerous proposed defenses,
albeit promising at first, have shown to be brittle and innefective to stop strong and adaptive attacks
though. This arms race between attacks and defenses makes the field of Adversarial Machine
Learning fairly dynamic and active, where the emergence of novel defense approaches almost daily
plays a role in becoming review papers quickly outdated.
Before this chaotic scenario, this work has aimed to attend the interested readerships by elab-
orating a comprehensive and self-contained survey that gathers the most relevant research on
Adversarial Machine Learning. It has covered topics regarding since Machine Learning basics to
12In black-box attacks, the term oracle often represents the target model the attacker wants to fool.
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adversarial examples and attacks, nevertheless with an emphasis on giving the readers a defender’s
perspective. An extensive review the literature has allowed recent and promising defenses, not
yet mentioned by other works, be studied and categorized following a novel taxonomy. Moreover,
existing taxonomies to organize adversarial examples and attacks have been updated in order to
cover further approaches. Furthermore, it has been gathered existing relevent explanations for the
existence and transferability of adversarial examples, listed some common policies that should be
considered by both defenders and reviewers when respectivelly designing and evaluating security
methods for deep learning models and provided some promising paths for future work. In summary,
the main contributions of this work were the following:
• The provision of a background regarding CNNs and some relevant architectures present in
literature ranked according to their respective performance in the ILSVRC top-5 classification
challenge from 2012 to 2017. It was also highlighted other important Deep Learning algorithms
in Adversarial Machine Learning, such as Autoencoders and Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs);
• The update of some existing taxonomies to categorize different types of adversarial images and
novel attack approaches that have raised in literature;
• A exhaustive review and discussion of defenses against adversarial attacks that were categorized
using a novel taxonomy;
• The address of relevant explanations for the existence and transferability of adversarial examples;
• The discussion of promising research paths for future works on Adversarial Machine Learning.
Securing against adversarial attacks is crucial for the future of several applications. Therefore,
this paper has been elaborated to provide a detailed overview of the area in order to help researchers
to devise better and stronger defenses. For the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the most
comprehensive survey focused on adversarial defenses available in literature and it is hoped that
this work can help the community to make Deep Learning models reaching their prime-time soon.
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A OTHER TASKS IN ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING FOR COMPUTER VISION
Besides Image Classification, Adversarial Machine Learning also takes part in various other tasks
of Computer Vision. Among the mainstream options, two tasks in specific are widely approached
in papers: (i) Object Detection and (ii) Semantic Segmentation. Object Detection tasks aim to identify
semantic objects in input images by surrounding each of them usually by drawing a rectangle,
also known as bounding box, around the detected objects. In turn, Semantic Segmentation aims
to represent an image into something more meaningful and easier to analyze by assigning a label
for each pixel in the input image which shares similar characteristics [58]. Table 3 references for
interested readers some related works in Adversarial Machine Learning towards Object Detection
and Semantic Segmentation.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: September 2020.
Adversarial Machine Learning in Image Classification: A Survey Towards the Defender’s Perspective 35
Table 3. Relevant works on Adversarial Machine Learning for Object Detection and Image Segmentation
tasks.
Work and Reference Task*
Xie et al. [192] OBJ, SGS
Metzen et al. [128] SGS
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [130] SGS
Fischer et al. [55] SGS
Lu et al. [119] OBJ
Chen et al. [32] OBJ
Thys et al. [178] OBJ
* OBJ: Object Detection; SGS: Semantic Segmentation.
B STANDARD DATASETS IN COMPUTER VISION
Datasets are important tools for evaluating Deep Learning algorithms. In the field of Adversarial
Machine Learning and Computer Vision, some most used datasets are summarized by Table 4.
Table 4. Popular Datasets in Adversarial Machine Learning for Computer Vision
Name and Reference Main Task* Year Classes Images’ Resolution Training Samples Validation Samples Testing Samples Total of Images
MNIST [102] ICR 1998 10 28x28x1 60,000 N/A 10,000 70,000
CIFAR-10 [95] ICR 2009 10 32x32x3 50,000 N/A 10,000 60,000
CIFAR-100 [95] ICR 2009 100 32x32x3 50,000 N/A 10,000 60,000
SVHN [137] ICR / OBJ 2011 10 32x32x3 73,257 531,131 26,032 630,420
GTSRB [169] ICR / OBJ 2012 43 [15x15x3, 250x250x3] 34,799 4,410 12,630 51,839
ImageNet [154] ICR / OBJ 2015 1,000 482x415x3 (average) N/A N/A N/A 14,197,122
CelebA [117] ICR / OBJ 2015 10,177 218x178x3 162,770 19,867 19,962 202,599
VOC2012 [49] ICR / OBJ / SGS 2012 20 469x387x3 (average) 5,717 5,823 10,991 22,531
MS-COCO [108] OBJ / SGS 2014 171 640x480x3 165,482 81,208 81,434 328,124
STL-10 [36] ICR 2011 10 96x96x3 5,000 100,000 (unlabeled) 8,000 113,000
Toronto Faces Dataset [172] ICR / OBJ 2010 7 32x32x3 2,925 98,058 (unlabeled) 418 101,401
* ICR: Image Classification and Recognition; OBJ: Object Detection; SGS: Semantic Segmentation; N/A: Not Available.
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